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THE JUDGES AND THE EXECUTIVE – HAVE THE 
GOALPOSTS BEEN MOVED? 
 
DENNING LECTURE 2005∗ 
 
Lord Lloyd of Berwick**
 
In lectures named after famous men, it is the custom for the lecturer to start 
with a tribute to the great man in question.  This is as it should be.  In the case 
of Lord Denning, the greatest judge of our time, one could start easily enough.  
The difficulty would be knowing where to stop. Fortunately the task of doing 
justice to Lord Denning, both as a person and as a judge, was undertaken by 
Lord Bingham before a huge congregation in Westminster Abbey in June 1999.  
It will never be done better.  So instead I will refer to just three incidents in his 
life. 
The first was at a lecture which he gave in Cambridge in 1950, shortly after 
his judgment in Central London Properties v High Trees House.1  The title of 
the lecture was “The Need for a New Equity.”2 At the end of the lecture an 
undergraduate at the back of the hall asked, “Where is this new equity going to 
come from?”  “Modesty” said Lord Denning in that marvellous Hampshire 
burr, “forbids me to say.” 
The second incident was towards the end of his career when he was much 
given to writing books.  He gave me a copy of one in which he wrote: 
 
“To Tony Lloyd, the most accomplished of Judges, confident 
that he will soon reach the Court of Appeal…. and to Jane who 
charms us all…” 
 
 You can imagine my pride and delight. So I took it next door to show to 
my friend Christopher Staughton. “Ah” he said as he went to a shelf, and took 
down another copy of the same book. In it I read: 
 
“To Christopher Staughton, the most accomplished of 
Judges….and to Joanna who charms us all…”   
 
 You can see why so many people regarded him as not only the greatest 
judge of our time, but also the most endearing. 
∗ Delivered to The Denning Society Lincoln’s Inn Hall, 23 November 2005. 
** Rt Hon Lord Lloyd of Berwick, a former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. 
1 Central London Properties v High Trees House [1947] KB 130. 
2 Lord Denning “The Need for a New Equity” (1952) 5 Current Legal Problems 1. 
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Finally, something from the end of his life. It is a letter written by Sir 
Edward Ford to The Queen describing the occasion on which he presented 
Lord Denning with the badge of the Order of Merit.  I have Sir Edward’s 
permission to quote from the letter, and I wish that I had time to quote it all.  
Sir Edward describes the house in Whitchurch, only a stones throw from Lord 
Denning’s birthplace in a drapers shop in the middle of the town.  Lord 
Denning was sitting in his library, immobile, looking into space rather like a 
statue of The Buddha.  He had insisted on dressing up for the occasion and was 
wearing a morning coat, grey waistcoat and black striped trousers.  After the 
badge had been presented, and the ribbon placed round his neck, Lord Denning 
spoke “with considerable humour and discernment about his colleagues.”  He 
talked also “with relish of his enjoyment of presiding in the Court of Appeal as 
Master of the Rolls, where he could exercise his own judgment as to the 
intention of an Act of Parliament, as opposed to those who felt that this was no 
business of a Court of Law.”  He admitted that he was sometimes wrong, and 
not infrequently reversed on appeal.  He constantly referred to the love of his 
garden, straddling the Test, which according to him, “was the most beautiful 
garden in England.”  That is the picture which Sir Edward Ford paints of a 
great and good man in extreme old age.  It reminds one of the death of Falstaff: 
“His nose was as sharp as a pen and he babbled of green fields.” 
I now turn with reluctance to the subject of my lecture.  I will start with a 
quotation.  It comes from a debate initiated by Lord Irvine of Lairg in the 
House of Lords to call attention to the relations between the judiciary, the 
legislature and the executive. 
 
“I believe that this debate is timely.  It comes when the country 
must believe that there is unprecedented antagonism between 
the judges and the Government both over Judicial Review of 
ministerial decisions and the restrictions which the 
Government propose on the judicial discretion in sentencing.  
Certainly, there has been a long string of decisions striking 
down Ministerial actions as unlawful.  That has even led to 
some politicians calling Judicial Review itself into question.  
The public must be perplexed by what they perceive as a major 
clash over the distinct roles of Parliament, Ministers and the 
judges.” 
 
That debate could have taken place at any time during the last few years.  It 
in fact took place during the dying days of the Conservative Government in 
June 1996, when Michael Howard was Home Secretary.  The politicians to 
whom Lord Irvine referred as having called Judicial Review into question, 
were not, of course, Labour politicians but Conservative politicians. 
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I start with that quotation because I want to emphasise at the outset, that I 
shall not be attacking the attitude of any particular Government.  Indeed I shall 
not be attacking anyone at all.  The title of my lecture is not “Judges and the 
Government,” which might have been understood as a reference to this 
Government; but judges and the executive.  My theme will be that so far as 
relations between judges and the executive are concerned, all Governments are 
much the same.  One might have thought that a Labour Government would be 
less executive-minded (to use Lord Aitkins’ famous phrase) and less 
authoritarian than a Conservative Government.  But this has not proved to be 
the case. 
So if I refer to events when Mr Blunkett was Home Secretary, and now 
Mr Clarke, that is only because they are more recent, and therefore fresher in 
our minds.  If a week in politics is a long time, the days when Mr Howard was 
Home Secretary, although only ten years ago by the calendar, seem like the 
Middle Ages. 
In his recent press conference the Lord Chief Justice said that there is no 
conflict between the judges and the Government.  He was right. However the 
fact that there is no conflict, does not mean there is not tension.  There is, and 
always will be.  For if there is no tension between the judges and the executive, 
it will mean that the judges are not doing their proper job.  Yet it would be an 
error to think that the tension is greater now than it ever was.  When Mr 
Blunkett wrote in the Evening Standard that confidence in our criminal justice 
system was at an all time low, the late Earl Russell pointed out that he was 
mistaken.  In 1388, all the judges were impeached, and the Chief Justice was 
executed.  In 1609 when James I was arguing with his Chief Justice Sir Edward 
Coke, the King became so incensed that he threw a punch.  Things are not as 
bad as that. 
Lord Irvine in his speech referred to two of the main areas of tension, 
Judicial Review and sentencing.  I shall look at each of those in turn.  There 
are, of course, other areas of underlying tension.  But these are the areas where 
the tension most frequently comes to the surface. 
I start with Judicial Review, because Judicial Review is so little understood 
by the public and is so often misepresented by the press.  What is Judicial 
Review?  It is the means by which judges exercise control over administrative 
acts, including acts of the executive.  The purpose of Judicial Review, put very 
simply, is to make sure that the executive acts within the law, and in particular 
within the powers they have been given by Parliament.  The extent of those 
powers is a question of law; and it is the existence of that question of law 
which justifies the intervention of the courts.  Once Parliament has granted the 
powers, whatever they may be, it is not for Parliament to say what they mean, 
and still less the executive.  It is for the courts. 
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Every other western country has a system of administrative law, in many 
cases more advanced than our own.  Thus in most if not all western countries 
there is a right to challenge legislation, both before and after it has been made.  
Such a right would be unthinkable under our system.  Nevertheless, the right of 
the courts to question the lawfulness of administrative acts has always been 
there, even though it was exercised sparingly, and on more limited grounds, 
under the guise of the old prerogative writs.  In the great case of Conway v 
Rimmer3 in 1968 Judicial Review was given a second birth.  In 1976 it was 
given a new name.  It was the rebirth and subsequent growth of judicial review 
which Lord Diplock described as the most important event in his judicial 
career. 
In 1976 there were some 500 applications for Judicial Review.  By 2000 
there were 4,242.  By 2004 it had reached 6,057.  This year it is likely to 
exceed 10,000. Ministers use these figures to suggest that the judges are 
becoming too aggressive.  Are they right?  Is there any evidence that the judges 
have been stepping beyond their constitutional role?  Are they exercising a 
political function in Judicial Review or are they not?  Those are the very 
questions which Lord Wilberforce posed in the debate in the House of Lords in 
1996 to which I have already referred.  In 1996 he answered both questions 
with a categoric negative.  I believe he would give the same answers today. 
So what is the explanation for this great increase in Judicial Review?  Well 
the first and obvious point is that the courts have no control over the number of 
applications that are made.  Anybody can apply for Judicial Review, if he has a 
grievance or feels he has a grievance, because of some action or inaction on the 
part of the executive.  The judges cannot stop him.  So the relevant question is 
not how many applications are made, but how many applications have 
succeeded.  In fact the number of successful applications has fallen steadily 
from 730 in 2000 to 141 in 2004, and the proportion of successful applications 
has remained roughly the same, at a little over half.   
So what is the explanation for the huge increase in the number of 
applications for Judicial Review, since it clearly cannot be that the judges are 
becoming more aggressive. One obvious explanation is the increase in the 
number of asylum seekers.  Another is that as we become subject to more and 
more regulation in our everyday lives there is more and more scope for genuine 
grievances. Moreover we are now more than ever aware from what we read in 
the newspapers of our right to ventilate those grievances in court.  Those 
reasons are surely enough to explain the increase. 
I accept, of course, that if the substantive grounds for quashing a decision 
of the executive had become more favourable to the complainant, then the 
executive might indeed have cause for concern.  But I see no evidence that that 
3 Conway v Rimmer and Another [1968] AC 910. 
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is so.  It is true that, the language in which the test is expressed has moved on 
from the original statement in Wednesbury4 through the more recent 
formulation of Lord Diplock in the GCHQ5 case.  But the underlying function 
of the judge in Judicial Review is exactly the same as it always was; he is not 
to substitute his own views of what is reasonable for that of the executive.  He 
is there to ensure that the executive comply with the rule of law.  Judicial 
Review is thus the foundation of the rule of law, just as habeas corpus is the 
foundation of personal liberty.  Unless the judges perform that vital function, 
the outlook for our Parliamentary democracy would be bleak indeed. 
So if I am right that the answers to Lord Wilberforce’s questions are the 
same now as they were in 1996; if, in other words, the judges are not exercising 
a political function in Judicial Review, or straying beyond their constitutional 
role, the next question is whether there have been any departures from that 
general rule.  Can the executive point to any case in which an individual judge 
has gone beyond his proper role?  This is what Mr Blunkett set out to do in 
2003.  The judge in question was Mr Justice Collins. 
The case was an application for Judicial Review arising out of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.  That was the Act under which 
asylum seekers were required to lodge their claims for asylum as soon as 
reasonably practicable after arrival, or lose their right to benefits.  It is 
important to notice that the judge did not say that the legislation was 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act or anything of that sort.  He said 
merely that the way in which immigration officials were operating the Act was 
unfair.  He said also that depriving asylum seekers of all means of support 
could amount to inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of 
ECHR, a point on which he was upheld very recently by the House of Lords: 
see Limbuela v Secretary of State for Home Affairs.6 Mr Justice Collins 
delivered his judgment in the usual way at 10.30am on 19 February 2003 in the 
Administrative Court in the Royal Courts of Justice.  Mr Blunkett was 
interviewed the next day on the BBC Radio 4 programme “World at One.”  He 
said: 
 
“Frankly, I am fed up with having to deal with a situation 
where Parliament debates the issues and the judges then 
overturn them…I am absolutely clear that we do not accept 
what Mr Justice Collins has said.  We will seek to overturn it.” 
4 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223.  
5 Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 
AC 374. 
6 R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (Tesema) v Same; R 
(Adam) v Same [2005] UKHL 66, [2006] 1 AC 396. 
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In fact the relevant provisions of the 2002 Act were debated very little.  
They were introduced by a late Government amendment in the House of Lords.  
But I pass that by.  I will come back later to the way in which Mr Blunkett 
attempted, as he put it, “to deal with the situation.”  At this stage I note only 
that these words were not spoken in the heat of the moment.  They were spoken 
the following day after time for reflection. 
In due course the Home Office did indeed seek to overturn Mr Justice 
Collins’ decision.  But they failed.  On 18 March the Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal, holding that the system established under the Act for 
restricting benefits “had serious defects,” and had, as Mr Justice Collins had 
said, been applied unfairly. 
It would have been well if the matter had ended there.  But it did not.  After 
still further time for reflection, Mr Blunkett wrote an article for the Evening 
Standard.  The headline was: “I won’t give in to the judges.”7  He called for a 
long hard look at the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the 
judges, and was clear as to how that relationship had changed. 
 
“Judges now routinely use Judicial Review to rewrite the effect 
of the law that Parliament has passed.” 
 
The article concludes: 
 
“At the moment we all too often have the worst of all worlds in 
which Parliament deliberates for months over laws which are 
then systematically undermined by overly aggressive Judicial 
Review decisions.” 
 
A few days later he addressed the Police Federation at Blackpool.  He 
denied rumours that he was: 
 
“not at all pleased with the judges, I just want judges to live in 
the same real world as the rest of us; I just like judges who 
help us and help you to do the job.” 
 
The rumour that Mr Blunkett was not at all pleased with the judges recalls 
the practice of King John before Magna Carta.  When he deprived a man of his 
lands the official record would record the reason as being “because we were 
cross with him.” 
7 The Evening Standard, May 12 2003. 
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It could be said that none of this matters greatly so long as the judges, like 
Mr Justice Collins, are unaffected, as I am sure they are, in the job they do.  
But it is unpleasant all the same to be attacked, especially as judges, unlike the 
wicked animal in the proverb, do not defend themselves. 
But there is a price to pay.  For when Ministers criticise the judiciary as a 
whole, or attack the decisions of individual judges, it is inevitably taken up by 
the press.  And people believe what they read.  The Daily Telegraph reported 
the Prime Minister as saying that he was prepared for a “show down with the 
judiciary to stop the courts thwarting the Government’s attempts to curb the 
record flow of asylum seekers into Britain.”  He had ordered new legislation 
“to limit the role of judges in the interpretation of International Human Rights 
obligations and to reassert the primacy of Parliament.”  When the Prime 
Minister, if he was correctly reported, says that the judiciary are “thwarting the 
will of Parliament” in the matter of asylum seekers can anyone doubt that 
undermines the trust which people place in the judiciary? Fortunately, the polls 
all show that trust in the judiciary is still very high; far higher than trust in 
politicians.  But trust is a precious commodity, and should not be put at risk. 
Let me give an example of what I mean.  Not long ago, I was startled to be 
told by a friend that he was much concerned about the attitude of judges in 
asylum cases.  A few days later he sent me a leader from the Telegraph as 
confirmation of what he had been saying.  The leader is headed “When judges 
stand in the way of justice.”8  The thrust of the article is that judges always and 
everywhere oppose repatriation orders not just of illegal immigrants but of 
known villains. 
 
“Even if our judges were the wisest and the most disinterested 
people in Britain they would have no right to cross the line that 
separates the judiciary from the legislature.” 
 
Our judges may not all be equally wise.  But the suggestion in a 
responsible newspaper that they are not disinterested does enormous harm.  
And so does the suggestion that they continually cross the line that separates 
the judiciary from the legislature.   
I go back to February 2003 when Mr Blunkett said he would have to “deal 
with the situation” as he put it.  We did not have long to wait.  On 27 
November 2003, the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Bill 
came on for its first reading in the House of Commons.  By clause 10 there was 
to be a new Section 108A in the 2002 Act which would provide: 
 
8 The Daily Telegraph, September 24 2005. 
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“No court shall have any supervisory or other jurisdiction 
(whether statutory or inherent) in relation to the [Asylum and 
Immigration Appeal] Tribunal.” 
 
There was no mistaking here the government’s intention to change “the 
rules of the game.” This was the showdown with the judges for which the 
Prime Minister had said he was prepared.  The judges would no longer have the 
power to question decisions of the Tribunal.  Errors of law would go 
uncorrected.  The new clause 108A was heavily criticised by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights in its 5th Report published on 10 February 2004.  
Ousting the review jurisdiction of the High Court would, in the view of the 
Joint Committee, be a direct challenge to the rule of law, which includes the 
principle that people should have access to the ordinary courts to test the 
legality of decisions of inferior tribunals.  Such an ouster had not been justified 
by any argument advanced on behalf of the Government. 
Despite the advice of the Human Rights Joint Committee the Home 
Secretary pressed ahead.  When the Bill reached the House of Lords, the ouster 
clause was still there.  But then a strange thing happened.  Lord Irvine of Lairg 
put his name down to speak on second reading.  Although he was often to be 
seen on Government back benches since his resignation as Lord Chancellor in 
June 2003, he had not opened his mouth.  What he would have said on second 
reading we do not know.  I would give much to have heard that speech.  But as 
soon as he put his name down the ouster clause mysteriously disappeared from 
the Bill.  And as soon as the ouster clause had disappeared from the Bill, Lord 
Irvine withdrew his name from the speakers list.  I will always remember that 
incident as a paradigm example of power exercised from beyond the ministerial 
grave. 
Pausing there, and returning to the title of my lecture, I hope I have shown 
that in the field of Judicial Review it is not the judges who have been seeking 
to “move the goalposts” but the executive.  The attempt to exclude Judicial 
Review in asylum cases was, in my view, outrageous.  Fortunately, it failed.  I 
return later to speculate what would have happened if the attempt had 
succeeded.  In the meantime, I remain puzzled why it was that neither the Lord 
Chancellor, nor other Ministers whose duty it is under the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 to uphold the existing rule of law and the continued 
independence of the judiciary, raised so much as an eyebrow.  It makes me 
wonder how effective those solemn words will prove. 
I now turn to the second of my two areas of tension.  I start with another 
quotation.  In 1996 a Conservative Government published its proposals for 
automatic life sentences for those convicted of a serious violent or sexual 
offence for the second time and minimum sentences of seven and three years 
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for repeat class “A” drug offenders, and domestic burglars.  In a speech in the 
House of Lords the Lord Chief Justice Lord Taylor said: 
 
“I believe it to be of the first importance for me, while still 
holding the office of Lord Chief Justice, to inform the House 
directly of the grave consequences which will follow if the 
main proposals of the White Paper were given statutory affect . 
. . Quite simply, minimum sentences must involve a denial of 
justice.” 
 
Those who heard that speech, as I did will never forget it.  Lord Taylor was 
very ill.  It required immense courage for him to come to the House at all.  
Within a month or two he had retired at Lord Chief Justice and within less than 
a year he had died. 
The proposals which Lord Taylor has condemned were later implemented 
in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.  When the Bill was going through 
Parliament, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, who had succeeded Lord Taylor as 
Lord Chief Justice, expressed his “profound anxiety.”  He posed four questions 
for consideration in the House of Lords.  (1) Were the provisions just?  (2) 
Would they protect the public by reducing the level of crime?  (3) Would they 
be cost effective?  (4) Would they be workable?  He answered all four 
questions in the negative.  I would give the same answer to all four questions 
today. 
The Labour Government has added to the list of offences carrying a 
minimum sentence.  Thus there is now a minimum sentence of five years for 
the possession of certain firearms.  But more important the Government has 
introduced an elaborate scale of starting points for determining the minimum 
term to be served by a convicted murderer, together with detailed aggravating 
and mitigating factors to be taken into account.  These powers are contained in 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  They were Mr Blunkett’s answer to the 
decision of the House in Lords in Anderson v Secretary of State,9 the case in 
which it was held that the part hitherto played by the Home Secretary in fixing 
the so-called tariff for convicted murderers was contrary to Article 5 of the 
European Convention. 
Why are minimum sentences so unjust?  The reason is simple.  The 
purpose of all good sentencing must be to make the punishment fit the 
particular crime not the criminal offence.  The circumstances in which crimes 
are committed are infinitely various.  This is above all true in the case of 
murder which ranges from mercy killing at one end of the spectrum to the most 
brutal and most sadistic murders at the other.  But the same is also true of other 
9 [2003] 1 AC 837. 
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crimes for which minimum sentences have been set.  It is the function of the 
judge who presides at a criminal trial - perhaps his most important function - to 
determine the sentence.  He has seen the defendant in the dock.  He has heard 
all the evidence.  He knows all the circumstances.  He is aware of the 
defendants previous record.  He will be familiar with the guidelines laid down 
from time-to-time by the Court of Appeal for similar offences.  Why then can 
the judge not be trusted to impose the appropriate sentence?  Why should 
Parliament want to place him in a sentencing straight-jacket? 
It is said that Parliament must have a hand in sentencing so that it can 
reflect the views of the electorate.  But this greatly under-estimates the extent 
to which sentencing policy is already influenced by public opinion.  Let me 
give an example from my own experience.  When I first became a judge most 
cases of causing death by dangerous driving were dealt with by a fine or short 
sentence of imprisonment.  For the most serious cases it could be eighteen 
months or perhaps two years at the most.  Nowadays such offences would meet 
with a sentence of six or eight years.  That has been brought about not by 
Parliament imposing a minimum sentence, but by Parliament increasing the 
maximum sentence, from seven to fourteen years, a sure way of bringing about 
a rise in the general level of sentences for a particular offence, if that is what is 
required.  But it has also been brought about by the judges’ own understanding 
of what the public requires.  It is said that that is a job for politicians, not 
judges. The judges are “out of touch with the real world.”  I am not so sure.  
Judges, like everybody else, read the newspapers and watch television.  Like 
everyone else they learn from experience, from conducting trials and hearing 
appeals.  A research project carried out among juries has shown that when 
jurymen have been asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the sentence of 
the judge, one third had no view one way or the other and can therefore be 
disregarded.  But one third said that the sentence was just about right.  Of the 
remaining third, half said the sentence was more than they expected and half 
said that it was less.  Is it just possible that judges are more in touch with the 
real world than politicians imagine?  More even, dare I say, than the politicians 
themselves? And by real world I mean the twelve men and women whom they 
see in the jury box every day? 
Of course there will be cases where the sentence is much too low just as 
there are cases where the sentence is much too high.  But that problem is not 
solved by a regime of minimum sentences.  It is solved by the Court of Appeal.  
That is the very reason why the Attorney-General is given power to refer cases 
to the Court of Appeal if he is of the view that the sentence is unduly lenient.  I 
have to confess that I was opposed to that reform at the time.  But I have 
changed my mind.  The reform has worked. 
Then it is said that the discretion of the judge is not excluded altogether, 
since the judge is entitled to disregard the minimum sentence if in his opinion, 
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which he must state in open court, there are exceptional circumstance.  But 
“exceptional circumstances” are not defined; and in practice the term is given a 
narrow meaning.  Although it will enable the judge to mitigate the harshness of 
a minimum sentence in some of the cases to which the minimum sentences 
would apply, in the great majority of cases, it will not. 
Then it is said that minimum sentences have worked well enough in the 
United States.  So they could be made to work here.  But minimum sentences 
are not working well in the United States.  They are a source of constant 
friction between the judges and Congress.  In 1984 Congress passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act which laid out an elaborate sentencing framework 
within which federal judges are obliged to work.  But it allowed what are called 
downward departures from the sentencing guidelines.  The 1984 Act was 
passed after full consultation with the Judiciary.  Not so the Protect Act which 
was passed by Congress in 2003.  Members of Congress evidently believed that 
there were too many “downward departures from the sentencing guidelines.”  
At least that was the explanation given by the late great Chief Justice Rehnquist 
in his 2003 year-end report on the Federal Judiciary.  Under the provisions of 
the Protect Act, Congress will gather information about individual judges.  
They will discover how often and to what extent individual judges have 
sentenced below the guidelines.  The Chief Justice described this in his report 
as “somewhat troubling.”  He was not given to overstatement.  It could, he said, 
“appear to be an unwarranted and ill considered effort to intimidate individual 
judges in the performance of their judicial duties.”  It is clear both from his 
2003 report and from his subsequent and last report in 2004 that Rehnquist CJ 
was seriously concerned by the effect that minimum sentences was having on 
relations between Congress and the judiciary.  It is not an example which we 
should follow. 
The experience of the United States shows also that where discretion is 
excluded in one area of the law it will always break out in another.  This 
phenomenon was described by Lord Bingham in the speech from which I have 
already quoted.  It was subsequently referred to by Earl Russell as “Bingham’s 
Law.”  The consequence of Bingham’s Law is that minimum sentences may 
well prove counter productive in practice.  If a successful prosecution for a 
second serious offence would produce a result which is obviously unfair, one 
of two things will happen.  Either the prosecution will proceed on a lesser 
offence, which does not attract the automatic life sentence; or if the prosecution 
proceeds with the more serious offence the jury will refuse to convict.  Putting 
it at its lowest, a defendant faced with a second trial, is unlikely to plead guilty 
even if he is caught red-handed. 
So why do governments place so much faith in minimum sentences?  Their 
stated object is usually to protect the public.  For that purpose they say they 
must send out a “clear message” that repeat offences will not be tolerated.  But 
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I sometimes wonder who actually receives these messages.  Is there any 
evidence that these messages are ever received by the criminals themselves 
who may or may not be minded to commit a second serious offence? Is there 
any evidence that they are actually deterred? Is it unduly cynical to think that 
the real reason for introducing minimum sentences is the same as that which 
underlies so much Government legislation that the Government wants to be 
seen to be doing something about something, in this case rising crime.  I 
remember so well after the Omagh bombing in 1994 Parliament was recalled.  
Tough new measures were promised. (Incidentally why do tough new measures 
always come in rafts?)  But what emerged was a provision which enables a 
Police Officer of certain seniority to give evidence in court that in his opinion 
the defendant belonged to a terrorist organisation.  Needless to say, that 
extraordinary provision which, to its shame, has now been re-enacted as 
Section 108 of the Terrorism Act 200010 has never been of the slightest use to 
anyone.  But it served its purpose of demonstrating that the Government was 
doing something. 
Once again I return to my title.  Have “the goalposts moved?”  The answer 
must be “yes.”  And it is the legislature which has moved the goalposts by 
depriving the judges of their discretion in an important field of sentencing.  
Section 26911 and Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was an attempt 
by the legislature, successful in the event, to regain some of the ground lost by 
the Home Secretary as a result of the decision in Anderson’s case.  Some 
commentators referred to it as “Blunkett’s revenge.”  But let the last words be 
with Lord Woolf.  In a speech on second reading of the Bill in the House of 
Lords which was as wise as it was restrained, he drew attention to the vital 
importance of taking sentencing out of politics, particularly in the case of 
crimes as serious as murder.  He was surely right.  And may I point out in 
10  Section 108: 
[This section was amended by the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, s  78(2).] 
   (1) This section applies where a person is charged with an offence under section 11. 
   (2) Subsection (3) applies where a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent 
states in oral evidence that in his opinion the accused- 
       (a) belongs to an organisation which is specified, or 
       (b) belonged to an organisation at a time when it was specified. 
   (3) Where this subsection applies- 
      (a) the statement shall be admissible as evidence of the matter stated, but 
(b) the accused shall not be committed for trial, be found to have a case to 
answer or be convicted solely on the basis of the statement. 
   (4) In this section 'police officer' means a member of- 
(a) a police force within the meaning of the Police Act 1996 or the Police 
(Scotland) Act 1967, or 
       (b) the Police Service of Northern Ireland.” 
11 Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence. 
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passing, now that I have quoted from the speeches of three Chief Justices in the 
House of Lords, that we shall never again hear the voice of the Chief Justice in 
Parliament again when Part 6 of the Constitutional Reform Act is brought into 
force.  This is something I deeply regret. 
Anderson’s case, to which I referred a moment or so ago, leads me 
naturally to the field of Human Rights.  It was impossible in that case to read 
the relevant statutory provisions so as to give effect to Article 6 of the 
Convention, so Section 3 of the Human Rights Act was not available.  The 
House of Lords had no alternative but to make a declaration of incompatibility 
under Section 4.  Different views have been expressed as to whether Section 3 
or Section 4 was intended to be the primary remedy under the Human Rights 
Act.  Whatever the correct view about that, it is at least certain that Section 4 
has proved effective.  In the few years since the Act came into force there have 
been seventeen declarations of incompatibility, of which five were overturned 
on appeal.  In every case where a declaration has been made, and not 
overturned, the Government has responded by repealing or amending the 
relevant legislation.  The most recent and by far the most significant case was 
the Government’s response to the Belmarsh decision.  I shall come back to that 
case in a moment.  But first I must return to my title. 
Has the Human Rights Act moved the goal posts?  The answer is obvious.  
Of course it has.  But not perhaps to quite extent that most people imagine, and 
certainly not to the extent that some commentators would wish.  The judges 
have always enforced human rights.  What the Convention did was to spell out 
the rights in the form of code.  From the moment the Convention came into 
force on 21 September 1953 our courts have interpreted ambiguous legislation 
so far as they could, in a way which was compatible with the Convention.  This 
is something which the courts have always done.  From the moment in January 
1966 when the United Kingdom accepted the right of individual petition, there 
has been a succession of cases brought before the court in Strasbourg in which 
the United Kingdom has been found to have breached Convention rights.  So 
the rights were there and could, if necessary, be enforced. 
What was new about the Human Rights Act in 1998 was that it “brought 
rights home.”  I have often wondered who invented that description.  It may 
have been Jack Straw himself, when he was Shadow Home Secretary.  But 
whoever it was, it was a stroke of genius.  The Act brought home rights in two 
quite different senses.  It enabled “home grown” judges to do what was already 
being done by judges in Strasbourg.  But it also brought home rights to the 
British people.  The passing of the Human Rights Act did more than anything 
to raise awareness of human rights, and our ability to enforce those rights in a 
domestic court. 
So the judges in England and Scotland have a new and important role.  It is 
a role which they acquired from a Labour Government, after many years of 
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resistance by the Conservatives.  Indeed it is a role which is increasingly thrust 
on the judges in current legislation. The 2002 Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act is a good example. Section 55(1) prohibits the Home Secretary 
from providing support to late applicants. But s 55(5) obliges him to provide 
support if is necessary to do so in order to avoid a breach of his human rights. 
This is the narrow path which the House of Lords explored in Limbuela’s case. 
The ground on which the Conservatives opposed incorporation of the 
Convention was that it would give too much power to the judges, and tempt 
them to cross the forbidden line into the realm of political decision making.  
While in one sense the judges have been given more power (although I would 
prefer to say they have been given a new role) they have been scrupulously 
careful not to cross the forbidden line.  This was never more clearly shown than 
in the Belmarsh case. 
The facts are now so well known, that a brief summary will suffice.  Under 
Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Government 
took power to detain foreign nationals who were suspected of being terrorists, 
if, for one reason or another, they could not be deported.  Since detention 
without charge was the clearest possible breach of the right to liberty under 
Article 5 of the Convention, the United Kingdom was obliged to derogate from 
the Convention under Article 15.  Accordingly, on 11 November 2001 the 
Home Secretary made a designated derogation order which was subsequently 
approved by Parliament on 21 November.  Sixteen suspected terrorists were 
thereupon detained at Belmarsh under Part 4 of the Act. 
Three years later, their case came before the House of Lords.  The question 
was whether the derogation order was valid.  This turned on whether there 
existed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (the first issue), 
and, if so, whether the measures contained in Part 4 for the indefinite detention 
of foreign nationals without charge went beyond what was strictly necessary.  
Where those measures “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.” 
On the first question eight out of nine Law Lords held that there were 
insufficient grounds to displace the decision of the Home Secretary that the 
safety of the nation was indeed threatened.  But on the second question they 
held that the measures taken to deal with the threat went beyond what was 
strictly necessary.  The reason for this view was that no such measures had 
been thought necessary in the case of British nationals.  The evidence was that 
the threat posed by British nationals was as great as that posed by foreign 
nationals, a point of fact upon which the events of 7 July have proved the Law 
Lords to have been right.  If the threat posed by British nationals could be 
contained by existing terrorist legislation without Part 4 of the 2001 Act, so 
could the threat from foreign nationals.  Thus the Government’s response to 
9/11 was one which was not “strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation.”  Accordingly, they quashed the designated derogation order.  But 
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they could not, of course, quash Part 4 of the Act.  They could only make a 
declaration of incompatibility, which they did. 
The importance of the case for the future lies in the test that the Law Lords 
applied in answering the two questions.  They rejected the Attorney-General’s 
argument that the courts must defer to the executive in all cases involving 
national security.  The best approach, according to Lord Bingham, was to 
analyse each issue according to its political content and its legal content.  The 
greater the political content and the smaller the legal content, the less scope 
there would be for the judges to intervene.  The first issue - whether there was a 
public emergency threatening the safety of the nation - lay at the political end 
of the spectrum.  The issue was not one on which the Law Lords were well 
qualified to express a view as judges.  Accordingly they declined to intervene. 
On the second issue, whether the measures contained in Part 4 were a 
proportional response, the position was different.  No doubt there was a 
political element in the decision, since it required the balancing of individual 
human rights against national security.  But the decision was not purely 
political.  It involved an element of judgment on which the Law Lords were 
qualified and entitled to express a view; and not only qualified and entitled, but 
obliged under the terms of the Human Rights Act.  As Lord Brown of Eaton-
under-Heywood has put it, “Judges nowadays have no alternative but to apply 
the Act.  It is a responsibility which they cannot abdicate.” 
If the Government had rejected the decision in A’s case, as it could have 
done, and renewed Part 4 of the 2001 Act when it expired, there would have 
been a major constitutional crisis.  I shall never forget the sense of relief when 
on 21 January 2005 just a few days before Part 4 of the 2001 Act was due to 
expire, Mr Clarke as Home Secretary announced that the Government would 
accept the declaration of incompatibility.  Part 4 of the 2001 Act would not be 
renewed.  Instead it would be replaced by new legislation.  Mr Clarke looked 
like a man in agony. But he made the right decision.  I would like to think that 
Mr Clarke’s quiet acceptance of the decision in A’s case marked the start of a 
new chapter in the relationship between the judges and the executive.  Instead 
of crying foul, as the Government might well have done when Mr Blunkett was 
Home Secretary, the executive has recognised that judges also have a job to do, 
especially in the realm of human rights.  If this is so, then A’s case was a 
decision of huge importance, not only in what it decided, but in the manner of 
the Government’s acceptance of that decision. 
Herein lies a paradox.  The implementation of the Human Rights Act by 
the judges might have lead to even greater tension between the judges and the 
executive than has been the case in the field of Judicial Review and sentencing.  
In fact it has not, because of the care which judges have exercised not to cross 
the forbidden line.  A’s case was a shining example.  If that example is 
followed by the judiciary, and if the executive shows the same self-restraint in 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
94 
other fields as Mr Clarke has shown in responding to A’s case, then the omens 
are good. 
I am glad to end on an upbeat note.  But I have one short footnote to add.   
I am alarmed by the Prime Minister’s hint that he will introduce legislation 
to limit the role of judges in the interpretation of human rights obligations, and 
to reassert the primacy of Parliament.  I hope he was misreported.  Because he 
must know that it is for the judges, and ultimately for Strasbourg, to say what 
the Convention means.  It has been said that Parliament can do anything except 
divide something into three equal fourths.  But except in the land inhabited by 
Humpty Dumpty, even Parliament cannot make words mean what they do not 
mean.  If the suggestion is that Parliament should change the words, then the 
question will arise whether we can remain parties to the Convention; and if we 
cease to be parties to the Convention the question will arise as to whether we 
can remain in Europe. 
I am very conscious that I have not had time to touch on what many 
commentators and two or three distinguished members of the Court of Appeal 
see as the most important effect of the Human Rights Act, namely, that it marks 
the start of a move towards a new constitutional settlement, in which 
fundamental or constitutional rights will sit alongside the supremacy of 
Parliament, with sovereignty being shared between Parliament and the courts.  
It is an exciting thought. It requires another lecture, of which there have already 
been many. I would say only this. If we are to move in that direction, we must 
move with great caution.  We cannot expect the executive to exercise self-
restraint in their dealings with the judges unless the judges do the same.  This 
will at once class me, I know, among Lord Denning’s timorous souls. But I 
must bear that with such equanimity as I can command. 
